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WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS 
The Contemporary Public Affairs Discussion Program is a project in which the Institute of Public Affairs of The 
University of Iowa offers to groups of concerned Iowans materials for use in informed discussion of state and na-
tional issues of importance. The materials are intended to inform, not direct, participants. The Institute and the Uni-
versity have no positions on any subject for which materials are provided. 
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WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS 
I. A Shaky Economy 
Throughout the closing years of the 1960's the American economy was plagued by 
ills which failed to respond to the remedies which were applied. The symptom which drew 
the most attention was the rise of prices--inflation. Usually when we talk about inflation we 
are talking about the rise in the prices which we pay for those items we buy from day to 
day. In other words, the first meaning of inflation for the average person is a rise in retail 
prices. The standard measure of retail prices in the economy is the Consumer Price Index. 
Beginning in about 1964 this index showed an increasingly rapid rate of rise, as indicated by 
the following figures: 
TABLE I : The Consumer Price Index Level and Per Cent of Rise Per Year, 
1964-1970 (Years 1957-59 = 100) 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Index 
Level 
108.1 
109.9 
113.1 
116.3 
121.2 
127.7 
135.3 
% of Rise from 
Previous Year 
1.7 
2.9 
2.8 
4.2 
5.4 
5.9 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor Review, 1965 through 1971. 
However, retail prices and the Consumer Price Index are only a part of the story of 
inflation. While prices were raising so were wages. In addition, the cost of setvices, of 
renting, and of borrowing money were all on the increase. A 10 per cent surcharge had been 
placed on personal income tax. And, finally, there was a rising rate of unemployment. 
TABLE II : Average Hourly Wage for Workers in Mining, Construction and 
Manufacturing and Per Cent of Rise Per Year 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
Hourly 
Wage 
$2.97 
3.07 
3.22 
3.37 
3.58 
3.85 
4.14 
% of Rise from 
Previous Year 
3.4 
4.9 
4.7 
6.2 
7.0 
7.5 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Monthly Labor R eview, 1965 through 197 1. 
What was behind these economic ills? The customary explanation for the root of such 
an inflation is summed up in the classic phrase "too much money chasing too few goods." 
The logic behind this statement is that an increase in demand increases the supply so that if 
people are demanding more goods and services, more goods and services will be supplied to 
them. However, there are certain physical limits on the supply . Such basic considerations as 
the number of plants, size of the labor force, availability of raw materials and so forth, limit 
the amount of goods and services that can actually be supplied. If everyone suddenly 
decided to buy a mink coat, for example, thousands of mink coats would not quickly flood 
the market. After all, there are only a limited number of mink pelts, only a limited number 
of pelt processors, and only a limited number of skilled coat makers. What would happen 
instead? From experience we all know that the ptice of the existing number of mink coats 
would sky-rocket while manufacturers pushed to gear up their production. Now, if this 
happens to the economy in general, that is, if people get too much money and they all start 
demanding to buy with it, the conditions are ripe for inflation. Such is the classical theory 
of inflation, often called demand-pull inflation. 
< 
Under this theory, how do you stem the rise in prices? Obviously we have a two-sided 
equation: too much money, too few goods. Since we can not do m.1ch in a short period of 
time to increase the number of goods, the answer is to work on the amount of money 
available. This can be done largely by raising taxes to take money out of circulation, by 
raising interest rates to slow the demand for bonowed money, and by cutting federal 
expenditures to ease the demand for goods. All these steps dictated by the classical theo1y 
of inflation were taken in the late 1960's by the Nixon administration. Still, as indicated in 
the figures cited previously, the rate of inflation did not slow down, rather, it increased. 
And, resulting from the measures intended to cure the inflation, there was also a problem of 
increased unemployment. Given the political climate it was natural that more drastic steps 
would be considered . Could the answer lie in an altemative theory of inflation called 
cost-push inflation? 
Under this theory, once an inflationary psychology has taken over, the people who 
make the various economic decisions (e.g. the producers who set the price of raw materials, 
the union officials who decide what wages to demand, etc.) begin to compensate ahead of 
time for the inflation that they expect to occur in the months ahead. If, for example, you 
are about to negotiate a three-year contract with management and you expect prices to go 
up 10 per cent each year, you might decide to ask for a 40 per cent raise spread over the 
three years in order to stay ahead of prices. Or, if you are a producer of raw materials and 
your employees got a 10 per cen t raise last year and the contract calls for the san1e raise 
next year, you might decide to raise your prices 25 per cent in order to keep ahead of your 
costs. The net result is that the costs of production go up and the resulting push on prices 
makes the expectation of inflation become a self- fulfilling prophecy. Under this theory of 
inflation the remedy is quite different from the one that we saw in the previous theory . 
Here the answer would seem to be to control the level of prices and wages in order to stop 
the spiral upward. 
It should be noted in passing that these two theories can be somewhat 
complementary, that is, a tempormy demand-pull situation can tligger a longer cost-push 
inflation. This may in fact be what happened in '64-'66 when the nation geared up military 
demand for Vietnam without raising taxes or in any other way trying to slow consumer 
demand. 
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One of the major proponents of some sort of control of wages and prices is John 
Kenneth GaJbraith, author and professor of economics at Harvard University. Professor 
Galbraith summarized his position in hearings before the Committee on . Banking and 
Currency of the House of Representatives, June 16, 1970. His major assumption, as you 
might suspect, is that the type of inflation which was being experienced in the late 60's was 
a cost-push inflation. His next assumption is that the push is focused at the intersection 
between big business and big labor. As he reported in his testimony: "farm prices, [and] 
prices of services generaJly at the moment are stable or even coming down, but prices in the 
organized sector of the economy-ptices in the sector of the economy where large 
corporations bargain with strong unions--still are going up." 1 It is into this critical nexus 
that Professor Galbraith would interject the two stage policy of a wage-price freeze followed 
by wage-ptice con trois. 
The freeze, as he sees it, would be of about six months duration and its purpose is 
largely psychologicaJ: 
The immediate need is to break the whole structure of inflationary 
expectations. By which I mean the expectations that prices are going to go 
up 6, 8, 10 per cent next year, therefore, you must have wage increases and 
interest rates to cover that kind of a price increase and must so plan your 
prices. 2 
At the end of this freeze period one would begin a period of selective controls: 
Where prices and wages are set by the market rather than by corporate and 
union power, there is no need to continue the freeze. This means that all 
retail prices, all farm prices, aJI wages not covered by collective bargaining 
contracts, aJI prices of finns employing fewer than 100 or possibly even 
1,000 workers should be promptly released from control. 3 
What would remain under control would be the prices and wages in industries which have 
strong private control over those ptices and wages. This action would control the "push" 
and thus, according to the assumptions, it would also control the inflation. 
Naturally there are those who would oppose such controls. Among the best known is 
Milton Friedman, author and professor of economics from the University of Chicago. As far 
back as the early 1960's Friedman had expressed his views publicly on such controls: 
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate 
officials and labor leaders have a " social responsibility" that goes beyond 
serving the interest of their stockholders or their members. This view shows 
a fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a free 
economy .. . 
[A] particular aspect of the doctrine ... is an alleged social 
responsibility of business and labor to keep prices and wage rates down in 
order to avoid price inflation. Suppose that at a time when there was 
upward pressure on prices--ultimately of course reflecting an incrtrase in the 
Statement in hearings before the Committee on Banking and Currency, House of 
Representatives, 91 st Congress, 2 nd Session, To Extend the Defense Production Act of 
1950, as Amended (Washington, D .C. : Govemment Printing Office, 1970), p. 7. 
2 Ibid., pp. 11- 12. 
3 Ibid ., p. 8. 3 
stock of money--every businessman and labor leader were to accept this 
responsibility and suppose all could succeed in keeping any pri ce from 
rising, so we had voluntary price and wage control without open inflation. 
What would be the result? Clearly product shortages, labor shortages, gray 
markets, blackmarkets. If prices are not allowed to ration goods and 
workers, there must be some other means to do so ... 
Price controls, whether legal or voluntaty, if effectively enforced 
would eventually lead to the destruction of the free- enterprise system and 
its replacement by a centrally controlled system. And it would not even be 
effective in preventing inflation. Hist01y offers ample evidence that what 
determihes the average level of prices and wages is the amount of money in 
the economy and not the greediness of businessmen or of workers. 4 
It does not seem that Friedman's views have changed any during the intervening 
years. In his column in Newsweek magazine on July 5, 1971, he discussed the predictions of 
his school of economic thought, then he says: "The monetarists--a smaller though growing 
group [those who would alter economic conditions by manipulating the quantity of money 
in circulation) --are forecasting a vigorous expansion with or without further fiscal me~ures. 
We believe that the real danger is an expansion so rapid that it will reignite inflation." 
Six weeks later, after the imposition of the wage-price freeze, Friedman reiterated his 
point that economic growth was already underway. 
Freezing wages and prices cap't do any good. But it can't do too 
much harm so long as the period isn' t longer than 90 days. I can 
sympathize with the President. He's been under tremendous political 
pressure to do something about the economy. 
You know, it's really extraordinary the snow job the Democratic 
politicians and the Democratic economists have accomplished. 
They've also persuaded the American people that our country is in a 
very bad economic state. It's not true. The economy is operating at a high 
level. 
They've also persuaded the American people that the recovery from 
the business recession is sluggish, very slow. Not true. The recovery pace is 
no worse than the previous four recession recoveries. 
Also, they have persuaded the American people that no progress has 
been made in reducing the rate of .inflation. Not true. The inflation rate has 
been reduced from more than 6 per cent to 4 per cent.6 
Thus, whether because of the demands of economic reality or because of the demands 
of political reality, the subject of wage-price control has become vital to the average 
American. What effects they can be expected to have will be the subject of our next unit. 
4 Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 133-135. 
5 Newsweek, July 5, 197 1, p. 62. 
6 "Friedman Declares Freeze Won't Work ," Chicago Tribune ,August 16, 1971 , 1: 1. 
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WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS 
I. A Shaky Economy 
Discussion Questions 
As a first point, there are some major concepts in these pages that you should be sure 
to have clearly in mind. Take a moment just to make sure everyone means ro~ghly the same 
thing when taJking about: Consumer Price Index, demand-pull inflation, cost-push inflation, 
markets under private control, and economic game plan (old and new). 
This country has imposed wage-price controls twice since the Depression. If any 
members of the group have experienced these previous controls, they could share those 
experiences with the other members of the group. 
How are such previous experiences likely to influence views of wage-ptice controls in 
the present? ' 
To what extent are the most vivid memories not of the controls themselves but of 
the shortages and the rationing? 
Does the concept of wage-price face any additional problem by being linked in 
people's minds with the problems of the war years such as shortage of consumer 
goods, black markets, etc. To what extent must these problems be linked with 
controls, if at aJI? That is, do they necessarily follow whenever such controls are 
imposed? 
We indicate two basic assumptions lie behind Dr. Galbraith's views of the economy: 
I) the inflation of the late ' 60's was largely cost-push, and 2) the reason for 'cost-push was 
primarily big business and big labor. Comment on these assumptions and analyze them. For 
example, one possible criticism is that much of the inflation was not in the manufacturing 
sector (where management and labor are strong), but in the service sector, as in the cost of 
health services, insurance, repairs, etc. Another possible ctiticism is that a large part of the 
inflation came from the cost of government: education, welfare , defense, etc. 
Professor Friedman makes severaJ points that are worthy of deeper consideration and 
discussion. 
He raises the issue of social responsibility. Do corporate and labor officials have such 
a social responsibility? Why? Why not? What types of social responsibility might 
they have or not have? 
Will the undertaking of such a social responsibility, as he infers, ultimately change 
the nature and character of our free economy? If so, how? 
Is our economy free or is that an assumption on Dr. Friedman's part. If it is free, in 
what sense(s) is it free? In what sector(s) is it free? 
To what extent would wage-price controls, as he says, necessarily mean a centrally 
controlled economy? 
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WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS 
II: A New Approach to a Changed Situation 
In a very basic way the move of President Nixon in August of 197 1 to freeze prices, 
wages, and rents was something quite new in American economic history. True, the 
technique of a freeze was not new, but it was being used in quite a new economic context. 
There were three previous instances of freeze followed by controls in our history: 
1917-1919, 1941-1946, and 19 51-195 3. Each of these periods was one in which the nation 
was beginning to become deeply involved in a wartime situation. There was a great increase 
in demand for military goods. In order that this new surge of demand would not bid up 
prices, steps were taken to stabilize price levels. 
In 197 1, however, the situation was quite different. The Vietnam war was 
economically in the past. Military demand, if it was doing anything, was dropping off and 
resulting in greater unemployment. Spending on the conflict in Vietnam had peaked in 1969 
and by 1970 was showing a significant decline. Production facilities, in fac t , were 
increasingly being idled. 
Two other notable changes had also taken place in the country, one of them 
economic, the other social. The economic change was that during the years since 1950 
people were increasingly becoming consumers of services rather than consumers of 
commodities as the following figures indicate: 
Percentage Index of 
of Personal Plices Paid 
Income Spent for Services 
Year On Services 1957-59= 100 
1950 32.7 73.4 
1955 35.9 89.4 
1960 39.6 107.4 
1965 40.6 120.0 
1969 42. 1 149.2 
Source : Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970, table 472, p. 312, and Economic 
R eport of the President, 1970, p. 230. 
At the same time they were paying relatively more for those services than for the 
goods that they bought. We can see this by comparing the index of prices paid for services, 
given above, with the index of prices paid for commodities. Note that the price of 
commodities is tising much more slowly: 
- Index of Index of 
Prices Paid Prices Paid 
for Services for Commodities 
Year 1957-59=100 1957-59=100 
1950 73.4 87.6 
1955 89.4 94.6 
1960 107.4 101.7 
1965 120.0 106.4 
1969 149.2 120.5 
I 
Source : Economic Report of the President, 19 70 , p. 230. 
The important point to be aware of here is that all of the inflation in the economy is not, as 
is often claimed, in those parts of the economy which are highly unionized, i.e. 
manufacturing. A good deal of it also exists in the area of services, i.e. hotels, laundries, 
beauty shops, advertising, repair services, entertainment, health ·services, etc. 
The social change which was affecting the economy was a restiveness among various 
groups over their place in the economic "pecking order." Many groups such as firemen, 
policemen, , teachers, sanitation workers, nurses, etc., began to see themselves as underpaid 
members of society and started to bargain for a better position on the economic ladder. 
It was into this strange situation of a dwindling war and soft demand for goods, but 
high demand for services, accompanied by rising prices, and rising unemployment and 
discontent about c;me's income status, that the new economic "game plan" was born. It is 
the only historical instance of stabilization controls being placed on the economy while we 
were not at the same time trying to increase production for a war effort. One can perhaps 
argue convincingly that what had to be done in 1971 was the result of what had not been 
done in 1965. That is, if we had made a better effort to keep the economy in balance when 
we were deepening our involvement in the conflict in Vietnam, we would not have had to 
step in and freeze it some six years later. By 1971 the inflationary problem seemed to be 
largely a psychological one. People had learned to anticipate a certain rapid rise in prices ( 4 
to 6 per cent per year) and thus were making adjustments which in turn made that expected 
rise a reality. 
At least this was repeatedly the theme of the administration in imposing the freeze 
and then the controls. At a news conference following President Nixon's announcement of 
phase two of his plan, Secretmy of the Treasury John B. Connally was asked: "What will 
have to be accomplished before the program will be terminated?" Secretazy Connally 
responded: 
I think there will have to be a basic agreement and feeling 
throughout the country that the inflationary psychology has been halted 
and has been broken and that there is in this country a commitment to 
stability, to price stability , to wage stability, so that we can know what to 
expect in terms of the future. 
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Now, I can't tell you what month and what day that we'll reach the 
point where we have, indeed , erased from the minds of people that they're 
living in a society where there's going to be nothing but continuing 
inflation. I 
What effects this particular "game plan" will have will become appa rent only with the 
passage of time. Some observers stated their belief in the days following the imposition of 
the freeze that we were attending at the deathbed of the free market system. Never again, 
they predicted, would the American economy be spared controls in a significant part of the 
traditionally free market place. The administration, however, was indicating that this was 
only a temponuy interruption. It was created in order to allow that system to come back 
into balance again . Regardless of the statements on either side, it seems reasonable to expect 
some rather notable and enduring effects from the present controls. Indeed, there have been 
such effects in the past. 
For sake of simplicity we will try to identify two levels of effect in this discussion. 
The first we will call structural effects to indicate that they operate at a very basic level ; that 
is, that they affect the very shape of the economy. The other level we will refer to as 
production effects to indicate tha t they are not so concerned with flow goods are produced 
(i.e. the structure of the system) but are more concerned with what particular goods are 
produced and what quality of goods are produced. 
One structural effect which lasts at least for the duration of the freeze was pointed 
out by Professor Louis H. Haney after the experience of World War I. He says: 
Any price fixing is bad in the sense tha t some of the advantages of free 
competition are abandoned, the most no table loss being that of the 
" weeding out" process which attends competition. As a result, there is no 
guarantee that the margin of production will be economically determined.2 
What he meant was that, as economists traditionally saw a free market economy, there was a 
price (i.e. the margin of production) beyond which it was unprofitable to produce a given 
item. Producers whose costs would not allow them to stay under that price simply had to go 
out of production, thus keeping production as a whole efficient. A perfect example of this is 
the lead mines at Dubuque. It was profitab le to mine lead there until the work reached the 
water table. The added cost of pumping water to keep the shafts from flooding caused the 
mines to close even though much lead remains. Normally this margin of production would 
be determined by the free interplay of supply and demand in the market place. However, 
with fixed prices, especially when they are fixed by a formula which allows a percentage of 
profit over and above cos ts, there is no way for this normal "weeding out" to take place . 
The consequence, then, is that many producers stay in production who ordinarily would 
not. The structure of the economy is changed and, according to the theory, made less 
efficient. 
Another structural effect which has been alleged to stem, at least in part, from the 
times of price control, especially World War I , is price-fixing among competitors. Associated 
with the World War I controls there was a strong growth spurt in several types of 
associations: labor organizations, trade organizations, and farm organizations. T he war time 
1 N ew York Times. October 9, 197 1; 16:4. 
2 Excerpt from "Price Fixing in the United States During the War," in Julia E. Johnson, 
Federal Price Con trol (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1942), p . 53. 
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.... 
situation probably only provided a catalyst for the sort of growth that is more or less 
inevitable. Yet the growth oL each of the associations has changed the shape of the 
economy. The question has been raised whether the trade organizations, in particular, in the 
years following government control of prices did not in fact carry on this same function 
privately by allowing compe titors to discuss common pricing policy and thus to render the 
free market substantially less free. Normally tllis takes the form of "price leadership" , i.e. a 
major manufacturer in the field announces a price rise and within a month most other 
manufacturers have followed suit. Occasionally, though, there is a kind of price-fixing 
scandal that hit the heavy electrical equipment industry in 1959-61. 
While these are structural changes in the economy, there is no doubt that their final 
result ends up being felt in the pocketbook of the average consumer. One of the possible 
effects of the 1971 freeze-control peliod will indicate that even more clearly. Tllis effect is 
called "a 'national incomes policy." It is not being too widely discussed in this country at 
the moment. Yet, it is definitely a part of the British scene in the aftermath of their 
freeze-control measures of 1966-67. As Lloyd Ulman indicates in the beginning of an article 
on British incomes policy, the underlying assumption of the progrrun is: 
tha t the British system of collective bargaining has contributed importantly 
to the continuous wage inflation, the slow rate of economic growth , and 
the relative low levels of productivity that have been instrumental in 
producing the balance of payments crises which have plagued the country · 
for the past 15 years. 3 
A national incomes policy, as we are using the term, then , is an attempt, which may take 
many differing forms, to change the structure of wage de termination in a country's 
economy. As yet, the British have not settled on a suitable and well defined national 
incomes policy, but they are searching for one. Sweden, on the other hand, already has a 
highly centralized policy of this kind. However, they also still have inflation! 
In 1965 the Labour government issued a White Paper which detailed to some extent 
their national plan for the British economy. Essential to this plan was "an effective incomes 
policy-with ari overall wage- salary norm of 3 to 3.5 per cent a year." 4 In the beginning 
stages of the plan, however, the so called Nil Norm applied. This mean t that no raises wou ld 
be allowed, except in two instances. The first of these was in the case of the " lowest paid 
workers." The second was for reasons of productivity. Ulman expands on this latter 
exception: 
What has come to be known in Britain as "productivity bargaining" r 
is potentially the more significant of the two exceptions to the Nil Norm, 
as least as far as the future development of collective bargaining is 
concerned. Under the productivity bargaining exception, wage increases 
would be allowed to groups of employees as compensation for identifiable 
contributio~s to increased productivity . .. 5 
An at tern a tive to this plan would be to allow a certain productivity raise to all workers in 
the economy, o r to all workers in selected segments of the economy, equal to some overall 
increase in productivity. 
3 "Under Severe Restraint: Brit ish Incomes Poli cy," Industrial R elations,6(M ay , 1967)2 14. 
4 Ib id., p. 22 I. 
5 Ibid , p. 248. 
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The point is that collective bargaining would no longer be based so le ly on the 
positions o l relative s trength between company and union. ln a systematic way, depending 
o n the particular plan , any proposed settlemen t would be judged against specified criteria by 
a review agency. Afte r this it migh t be subject to modification if it did no t meet those 
criteria. Such a program could be voluntary o r compulsory. Britain's early experience with 
an incomes policy was something less than totally successful and would lead to the q uestion 
o f how long any such program could work effectively while still remaining on a voluntary 
basis. 
The fundamental economic question, here and throughout this entire discussion 
seems to be: arc the infl ationary pressures generated in seeking both rapid economic growth 
and high employ ment so great that they can not be controlled by the free market as th at 
stru cture has evolved in modern industrial economies? The rise of control concepts such as a 
national incomes policy would seem to be a reluctant admission that the answer to the 
question may have to be "yes." However, it may also be true that no alternative structure 
can be any more effective than the free market in controJling those pressures. 
The second level of effect flowing from wage-price stabilization is what we have called 
production effects. These are more short-run effects related to what particular items get 
produced and to their quality. 
One example of a production effect is that controlled prices can create a sort of 
artificiality in the marke t p lace that makes it very difficult to tell what the consumer is 
willing to buy and a t what price. Therefore, production and demand get ou t of 
synchro nization. The price set on shoes, for example, may be such that it allows a fairly 
handsome profit. Thus, producers are attracted to this line of p roduction, especially since it 
does not call for highly expensive machine1y . As a result, we end up temporarily with the 
productio n o f many more shoes than the public really needs. The price of coats, on the 
othe r hand , may have been set lower and the profits there are not so great. As a 
consequence producers limit their p roduction of coats and emphasize related lines where 
more money can be made. The result is a temporary, artificial scarcity in the number o f 
coats avail able. A freely flu ctuating price level is related to the machinery of production 
much like the thermostat is related to the furnace. It regulates the output. But to introduce 
price controls is something like introducing a time lag be tween the thermostat and the 
furnace, so tha t the temperature reading is delayed by a week or a month in reaching the 
furnace. Eventually the furnace will adjust to the colder winter weather, but not without a 
lot of d iscomfort to those who have to live in the ho use. 
The 197 1 situation is not at all likely to produce this effect, but in some longer 
control pe riods such as the Second World Wa r this sort of effect was not only possible, but 
even intentio nal. Manipulation of the profit level was one way of attracting or discouraging 
production depending on whether the item was necessary or superfluous to the war effort. 
A no ther substantial production effect is that of a virtual price increase withou t ever 
changing the actua l price o f the item o n the store she lf. This is possible by lowering I he 
quality of the item. A classic example of this came up d uring the price control controversy 
in World War II. T he questio n was over the oil and wax treatments g iven to leather soles on 
5 
shoes. Not to treat the soles meant that their wearability was reduced an average of 28%. At 
the time this meant that the untreated shoes were about $1 less valuable per pair than the 
treated shoes. As a consequence, to stop treating the soles while holding the price of shoes 
stable would accomplish three things : l) decrease costs on the present pair of shoes and 
thus increase the immediate profit , 2) cause the customer to come back for new shoes 
more quickly and thus boost future sales at the increased profit level, and 3) in effect raise 
prices of shoes by selling a poorer quality shoe at the price previously charged for a better 
quality shoe. 
Each of the effects which we have mentioned, even those which seem a bit of an 
excursion into economic theory, ultimately brings its burden to rest on the shoulders of the 
consumer and wage-earner. It was this point which led Consumer Reports to make the 
following recommendations shortly after the freeze was imposed: 
Without cooperation from the consuming public, price controls 
cannot be enforced for very long. Without consumer representation in 
day-to-day policy making, each industry may wind up writing its own price 
ticket, as happened during the Korean war. The following steps need to be 
taken: 
CONSUMER ADVISORY COMMITTEES. These should be 
appointed to work at the national and regional levels with the Office of 
Emergency Preparedness [the agency which administered the freeze]. Their 
members should include only those wit!l no axe but the public's to 
grind ... Consumer interests should have a strong voice in every decision 
about whether to grant an exception to the wage-price freeze. 
CONSUMER, EDUCATION. A special effort must be made to inform 
the public of how price controls function, and how to report illegally high 
prices. 
POSTED PRICES. Every store should be required to post its 
maximum prices in a conspicuous manner .. . 
QUALITY STABILIZATION. When price-controls stretched into the 
indefinite future, as during World War II and the Korean war, 
manufacturers found it profitable to reduce quality, thereby achieving a 
hidden price increase. 
Effective price-control machinery must be developed as soon as 
possible to defeat any built-in economic incentive for manufacturers to 
degrade the quality of goods. Otherwise, U.S. products will lose further 
ground in world markets, and consumers at home will be cheated. That 
calls for compulsory labeling of products with their quality graded 
whenever a grading scheme already is in voluntary use, as in many food 
products and basic commodities. Government purchase specifications could 
form the basis for defining the quality line in many other products. 6 
Wage-price stabilization then is a policy with many immediate effects in our daily 
lives. It is important as Consumer Reports indicated for the public to be ed ucated about the 
way in which any such controls function and what effect they can have. This is the first step 
in acltieving broad based public represen tation among the agencies which will do the 
controlling. As every body from the President on down has indicated, the program can not 
work without ·cooperation from all segments of the country. One critically important factor 
in that cooperation may well be the presence in the decision making process of some 
representatives with no narrowly circumscribed self-interest ro le. 
6 "Who Will Control the Price-Controlers?", XXXVI (October, 1971)614. 
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WAGE-PRICE CONTROLS 
II. A New Approach to a Changed Situation 
Discussion Questions 
I. Discuss the two basic changes which are mentioned early in this section. 
A. There is a switch from consumption of goods to consumption of services. 
What has been your experience in this area? 
How much more (or less) do you spend on services now than in the past? Remember 
that you are buying a service when you buy insurance, visit the doctor, dentis t, or 
hospital, pay any dues, mail a Jetter, get something repaired, go to a movie, get a 
haircut or permanent, pay your rent; in short, any time you spend money and receive 
something other than a piece of merchandise. 
Another area you might consider is the cost of the "service" included in your 
merchandise; th e fact that it is pre-sh runk, pre-ironed, pre-cut, pre-seasoned, 
pre-cooked; or that it comes "complete with" spray top applicator, waxing agent, 
multiple attachments, gift wrapping, two year warranty and so forth. To what extent 
have these hidden serv ices raised your costs even for merchand ise items? 
Perhaps the most important point to discuss here is a slightly more technical one: to 
what ex tent is it possible to raise productivity in the service area? Traditionally we 
have offset inflation by granting raises in pay as more was produced for evety hour 
worked. How possible is it to apply that principle to teachers, insurance agents, 
doctors, TV repairmen , entertainers, barbers, and other service people? If it docs not 
apply well to the service professions, and they are becoming a larger and larger slice of 
the economy, what will offset the inflationary pressure of their raises in pay? 
B. There is an w1willingness to accept the traditional status relationships of the 
economic system. 
I 
We mentioned firemen, policemen, teachers, sanitation workers, and nurses as groups 
a ffected by this element of social change. What other groups can you think of that are 
restive about their place on the economic' ladder? 
How can any gro up move up without pushing someone else down? Samuel Gompers, 
president of the A.F. of L. at the turn of the century, once said that the goal of 
Ame ri c;ul labor was, "More." To wha t ex tent have all Americans taken Gompers' goal 
to heart? Discuss the implication for th e economy o f such a goal being held by most 
llll'tllbl'rs o r the work force. 
' DisL·uss th L' matter or an Amerkan nationa l inco nws policy . This concept has at least two 
IL'vels o r ntL'aning. At its broadest level it mea ns some thing like the whole ov~;:rall plan for 
the eco nomy, co nsistin g o f : I) a policy stat emen t about what the relationships with in 
the eco nomy ough t to be, 2) some agency or agencies to monitor these relJtionships and 
keep them in alignment, 3) a vm·iety of economic programs which are aimed at creating 
and supporting the desired relationships, and 4) a host of corrective fiscal and monetary 
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maneuvers. In general, we have used the term to mean something more narrow, a plan 
designed to control the structure of wages and salaries. Implied, but not mentioned 
directly, were all those other controls which would have to be added to make up the 
overall plan. 
Discuss whether it would be possible to have an incomes policy for America in the 
narrow sense without having it in the broad sense as well. That is, would it be possible 
to control wages and salaries, but not to control and review prices, rents, interest, 
profits, e tc. 
Discuss to what extent you think it will be necessary to develop such a policy, in 
either sense, for the American economy. That is, is it only a temporary necessity in 
order to get a better balance, or will it be a permanent necessity in order to keep the 
balance. 
Discuss whether such a program is workable on a voluntary basis, or whether it will 
have to be made compulsory in order to be successful. Here you may want to include 
in the discussion particular examples of the successes and/or failures of the Phase II 
Pay Board and Price Commission. 
3. If it has not come up in an explicit way already, discuss the central question of whether 
it is possible to have both rapid economic growth and high employment without also 
having an unacceptable level of inflation? 
4. Finally, discuss the matter of the quality of goods produced in the economy. That 
discussion should include at least the three areas mentioned in the recommendations of 
Consumer Reports: 
What sort of plan could be set up which would circumvent the built-in incentive for 
degrading the quality of goods? 
If the quality of American goods does drop what will that do to our place in world 
markets? And what repercussions will that have at horne? 
What sorts of quality labeling can be used? How helpful to you has present quality 
labeling been? How profitable would it be to you if it were used more widely? 
• 
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